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ARTICLE

The Bankruptcy Improvements Act
An Update

-

By Robert E. Ginsberg*
After the author had completed an article on the proposed
Bankruptcy Improvements Act ("BIA"),' printed earlier in this
volume, S. 2000 was reintroduced in the first session of the 98th
Congress as part of the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of
1983 ("OBIA").' That bill went through the committee process
where the original version of the BIA underwent some significant
changes.' As amended, the BIA was passed by the Senate and sent
to the House.4 This update of the original article will discuss some
of the more significant changes which the 1983 version of the BIA
would make in the proposals for consumer bankruptcy reform
which were made by the earlier versions of the BIA discussed in
the original article.
This update will focus solely on the Consumer Credit Amend* Professor, De Paul University College of Law. B.A., Brown University; J.D.,
American University, Washington College of Law; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The original article is The Proposed
Bankruptcy Improvements Act - The CreditorsStrike Back, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
1 (1982) (subsequent references to the original article will be to its pages in the
earlier issue of Volume 3).
2. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (OBIA).
3. See S. REP. No. 98-65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-22 (1983).
4. 129 CONG. REc. S5,388 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983). Although S. 445 was a
separate bill, it was linked to S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) which was a
Senate-passed proposal designed to solve the jurisdictional crisis in bankruptcy
created by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). See 129 CONG. REc.
S5,310 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983). This article will not discuss the controversy surrounding the status of bankruptcy judges and the various pending proposals in
that regard except to state the author's strong belief that the jurisdictional crisis
in bankruptcy can be finally solved only by giving bankruptcy judges lifetime tenure. However, there is no reason why proposals for consumer bankruptcy reform
must be linked to proposals for restructuring the bankruptcy judiciary in a way
which will pass constitutional muster except, perhaps, in the interests of political
expediency.
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ments proposed by the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of

1983. This is an important limitation because the 1983 bill would

make significant changes in several other areas of bankruptcy law
by altering provisions relating to executory contracts,5 adding provisions to deal with grain merchant failures,' and changing present
law to make debts incurred as a result of drunk driving nondis-

chargeable. 7 The OBIA also contains a number of proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which are labeled
"Technical Amendments." Many of these amendments are not
technical but are substantive and would have a significant impact
on consumer and/or business bankruptcy proceedings. 9
The most significant change which the OBIA would make in

the approach taken by the BIA to consumer bankruptcy reform is

in the area of the "threshold test." Under the BIA, if an individual
debtor whose reasonably anticipated future disposable income
level would enable him/her to have enough left over to pay creditors a reasonable portion of their claims over a reasonable period

of time were to file a chapter 7 petition, a creditor could seek dis-

missal of the chapter 7 petition unless the debtor agreed voluntar-

ily to convert the case to a chapter 13.10 This proposal generated
considerable opposition." Therefore, the OBIA tries to mollify the
opposition by striking a compromise with respect to the question
of whether an individual debtor with sufficient reasonably antici-

5. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Subtitles C & G (1983).
6. Id. Subtitle B.
7. Id. Subtitle D.
8. Id. Subtitle I.
9. See, e.g., S. 445 § 315(f) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 109 to make any debtor
who has had a case dismissed for failure to abide by orders of court or for failure
to appear, or who dismissed a case following the filing of a request to lift the stay
under 11 U.S.C. § 362 ineligible to file another voluntary petition for six months);
S.445 § 352(3) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 525 to prohibit a private employer from
firing an employee on account of that person having been involved in or having
received a discharge in a bankruptcy); S. 445 § 423(c) (adding a new paragraph to
11 U.S.C. § 1301 automatically terminating the codebtor stay on confirmation of a
chapter 13 plan to the extent that the plan does not propose to pay the debt in
full). This article takes no position on these or other substantive changes which
would be worked by the OBIA other than the changes proposed by Subtitle A
dealing with consumer bankruptcy. However, a question does exist whether significant changes should be proposed under the title "Technical Amendments."
10. See S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3-4 (discussed in the original article
at 8-15).
11. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-446, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. 49-68; 129 CONG. REc.
S5,386-S5,387 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983).
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pated future disposable income can use chapter 7 or whether such
a debtor will be confined to chapter 13 as the only practical
remedy.'
The OBIA tries to bring about this compromise in several
ways. First, it takes away the power of creditors to object to an
individual debtor's use of chapter 7 on the grounds that the debtor
is depriving creditors of access to the debtor's future disposable
income in order to satisfy their claims.' 3 Under the OBIA, only the
court itself may question whether the debtor can use a chapter 7
proceeding to deprive creditors of the right to reach the debtor's
future income to pay creditors' claims in full or in part. Creditors,
or the trustee for that matter, could not raise the question of the
debtor's use of chapter 7 on income grounds" and could not even
be heard on the issue unless the court requested their
participation. 15
Second, in deciding whether to dismiss a chapter 7 petition
filed by an individual debtor, the standard the court is to use is
whether permitting the debtor to use chapter 7 would be "a substantial abuse."' The OBIA does not define what would be a substantial abuse. However, the legislative history of the OBIA says
that "if a debtor can meet his debts without difficulty as they come
17
due, use of chapter 7 would represent a substantial abuse.1
If the court does conclude that the use of chapter 7 by the
debtor would be a substantial abuse, the court is to advise the
debtor of its intent to dismiss the petition and give the debtor a
chance to be heard on the question. 18 If the court does decide to
dismiss the chapter 7 on substantial abuse grounds, its decision
would be appealable; however, no appeal from a decision on the
question of substantial abuse of chapter 7 could be taken by either
a "creditor or representative of creditor."1 9 The OBIA would estab12. S. REP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 3-4.
13. Compare S. 2000 §§ 3-4 (discussed in the original article at 8-15) with S.
445 § 203.
14. S. 445 § 203(a).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. S. Ru. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 54.
18. S. 445 § 203(a).
19. Id. The debtor could take an appeal despite the fact that the court's dismissal would come under 11 U.S.C. § 305, which ordinarily would not be appealable. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 305(c). The OBIA would carve an exception to the general
rule that such dismissals are nonappealable where the dismissal was because the
debtor's use of chapter 7 would amount to a substantial abuse.
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lish a presumption that the debtor is entitled to use chapter 7 if
s/he wishes.20 On appeal, the bankruptcy court's finding of fact is
to stand unless clearly erroneous.21
The third major change which the OBIA works in the BIA approach to the threshold test is to establish a system of debtor
counseling designed to encourage individual debtors with regular
income to use chapter 13. A voluntary petition filed by an individual debtor or a joint petition filed by husband and wife is made
conditional in that the debtor does not finally designate what
chapter of the Bankruptcy Reform Act the debtor is going to proceed under until after the debtor has been counseled as to what
chapters are available to the debtor. 22 The debtor is to be counseled on chapter selection by the trustee. The counseling is to take
place immediately before the creditors' meeting, 3 and the debtor
is to be represented by counsel at the ounseling session.2 4 Furthermore, the trustee is to give the debtor an outline of chapter 7 and
chapter 13 and is to try to analyze how the debtor would fare in
chapter 7 and how the debtor might fare in chapter 13, given the
debtor's reasonably anticipated disposable income.25
The OBIA tries to insure that the trustee will remain neutral
on the question of chapter 7 versus chapter 13 for the debtor by
prohibiting the trustee from recommending one over the other or
from advising the debtor which one to choose. The trustee is not to
estimate for the debtor how the court might respond to a decision
by the debtor to remain in chapter 7.2 Counseling is not required
where the debtor is not eligible for chapter 13.27
20. S. 445 § 203(a).
21. Id.
22. S. 445 §§ 202, 207(2).
23. Id. § 204.
24. Id. Creditors are banned from the counseling session. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. This statement, to a certain extent, may be too general. Counseling is
not required where the debtor lacks regular income. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. §
101(24). In addition, the bill provides that counseling would not be required
where "the trustee determines and reports to the court that a reasonable chapter
13 plan could not be devised." S. 445 § 204. Thus, if the debtor was ineligible for
chapter 13 because, for example, s/he owed unsecured creditors in excess of
$100,000 in fixed unsecured obligations, it would seem that no chapter 13 plan
could be devised and no counseling would be required. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
However, such a debtor may be an appropriate candidate for chapter 11. See id. §
109(d). In such circumstances, the trustee probably should counsel the debtor
about the wonders of chapter 11 as a device for paying creditors. See S. REP. No.
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From both a theoretical and practical viewpoint, the OBIA
compromise is a very poor approach. Although references to the
debtor's future disposable income have been deleted, it is clear
that the court, in deciding whether use of chapter 7 by the debtor
is a "substantial abuse," will focus almost entirely on the amount
of income which the debtor is going to have available after expenses to satisfy creditor claims in whole or in part over a three- to
five-year period. The legislative history of the provision fairly
clearly points the court in this direction.29
It is hard to think of what else the court could look to. The
bankruptcy courts already have ample discretion to dismiss a
chapter 7 petition where the petition has been "filed in bad faith
and for the purpose of abusing the judicial process. ' 29 Thus, "substantial abuse" here must mean something different than bad
faith; it must mean that the debtor could treat his/her creditors
more fairly by, for example, filing a chapter 13 petition or by not
filing bankruptcy at all and paying creditors their just claims out
of reasonably anticipated future income.
The principal difference between the BIA and the OBIA in the
threshold area would seem to be in procedure rather than substance. Certainly, by taking from creditors the power to object to a
debtor's use of chapter 7, the chances for abuse are greatly lessened.80 However, the procedure suggested by the OBIA for raising
such objections seems virtually unworkable. The entire burden
falls on an overworked bankruptcy judge who must determine
whether it is suitable for the debtor to use chapter 7, in the first
instance at least, from a statement of current income and expenses
which the debtor will be required to file. This statement can be
filed as late as immediately before the creditors' meeting and
reveals only the debtor's current income. 81 A debtor who is about
to come into a great deal of income would not be required to reveal
that fact unless asked. Therefore, the court might not know if it
would be an abuse for the debtor to use chapter 7 in the sense of
depriving creditors of significant amounts of income which they
might use to satisfy their claims.
The OBIA would require the bankruptcy judge to convene the
98-65, supra note 3, at 54.
28. See S. Rzp. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 53-54.
29. In re Ericson, 26 Bankr. 973, 976 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983).
30. Cf. S. 2000 § 4 (discussed in the original article at 9, 13-15).
31. S. 445 § 207.
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creditors' meeting but not to preside over it.12 One can assume,
particularly in districts with a heavy volume of cases, that the

bankruptcy judge will convene the meeting, give the debtor the required Miranda warnings with respect to reaffirmations,33 and send
the debtor and trustee on their way to complete the meeting
outside of the bankruptcy judge's presence. If the trustee were to

develop information outside of the bankruptcy judge's presence
which indicated that the debtor's use of chapter 7 amounted to a
substantial abuse, the trustee apparently would be prohibited by
the OBIA from calling that information to the bankruptcy judge's
attention."

The problem is compounded by the fact that the debtor need
not file a statement of current income until immediately before the

creditors' meeting. 85 This means, in most cases, that the bankruptcy judge most likely will not receive any information about the

debtor's income and expense level until the meeting of creditors.
As a result, realistically the bankruptcy judge will not have time to

adequately consider and investigate the debtor's statement. In
those districts with a large caseload, the income statements will
likely be filed at the outset of the creditors' meeting. The bankruptcy judge is unlikely to convene the meetings individually. Instead, to save time, the judge will convene all meetings at once,
give the required Miranda warnings about reaffirmations to the
32. Id. § 206.
33. See id. § 210(b) which would amend 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d) to, inter alia,
abolish the discharge hearing and require the judge to give the warning with respect to reaffirmations and discharge now given at the discharge hearing at the
creditors' .meeting instead. As indicated at pages 40 to 44 of the original article,
this change is appropriate in that the warning is more meaningful before the
debtor negotiates reaffirmations. The author continues to have doubts about the
wisdom and practicality of putting the judge back into all creditors' meetings.
34. Actually, the OBIA is very confused and/or confusing here. Only the
court may raise the question of whether the debtor's use of chapter 7 would be a
substantial abuse. S. 445 § 203(a). However, if the trustee decides to waive counseling the debtor with respect to chapter selection because the trustee believes,
after examining the debtor's income statement, that chapter 13 is not feasible for
this particular debtor, the trustee is to report that fact to the court. Id. § 204.
Does that mean if the trustee concludes that chapter 13 is feasible, s/he is to
report that fact to the court as well? S. 445 § 204 seems to suggest that the trustee cannot file any report with the court about which chapter the debtor belongs
in. See also id. § 203(a). Would the absence of a trustee's report that chapter 13 is
not feasible for this debtor come to mean the debtor belongs in chapter 13? The
report process does not seem to have been very well thought out.
35. Id. § 207(2).
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debtors as a group, and then send the debtors and trustee out to
finish the meetings on their own. It is hard to imagine, in such
circumstances, that the bankruptcy judge will take the time to
read through a large stack of debtor's income disclosure statements, single out particular statements for further examination,
and proceed to conduct an individual creditors' meeting for those
debtors about whose use of chapter 7 the bankruptcy judge has
doubts.
The process is equally impractical with respect to the method
by which the bankruptcy judge is to question the debtor's final decision to use chapter 7 instead of chapter 13. Within ten days after
the counseling session and creditors' meeting, the debtor is to file a
statement with the bankruptcy court designating which chapter of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act s/he has finally chosen to proceed
under." The bankruptcy judge then has twenty days to reject the
debtor's choice if it is chapter 7.87
The court must act entirely on its own initiative and prepare
initial findings questioning the debtor's decision to continue the
chapter 7 case; this really amounts to a complaint to dismiss the
chapter 7.88 The debtor can then respond, and thereafter, the

debtor will find himself/herself in the rather strange position of
litigating in front of the bankruptcy judge in response to the
judge's own pleading. One can surmise that this system will be
viewed as being less than fair by those debtors required to respond
to a bankruptcy judge's questions about their use of chapter 7.
This system should be improved upon to insure that the
debtor gets a fair hearing in a neutral forum on the question of
whether the debtor will be allowed to proceed in chapter 7, if that
is what the debtor wants to do. It is tempting to suggest that the
trustee should be the one to question the debtor's right to proceed
in chapter 7. However, in a no asset case, the trustee's fee is only
twenty dollars. 9
Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect the trustee to get involved
in what could easily be protracted litigation where there is no real
36. Id.
37. Id. § 203(a).
38. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 330(b). The technical amendments provisions of the OBIA
would raise the trustee's fee in no asset cases to $45. S. 445 § 324(a). This increase
would not heighten the possibility of the trustee being willing to litigate the question of the debtor's eligibility to use chapter 7, as $45 would not pay for even one
hour of trustee's attorney's time.
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hope of a fee. Perhaps the trustee could take on litigating the question of whether the debtor is entitled to use chapter 7 on a kind of
contingent fee basis, with the trustee (or trustee's attorney) getting
paid for opposing chapter 7 only if the petition is dismissed (or
converted to chapter 11 or chapter 13). The trustee could then be
paid from the debtor's future disposable income which the trustee
has proven will exist. If the case is dismissed, the fee award to the
trustee could be enforced by some sort of garnishment order entered by the bankruptcy court. If the case is converted, the trustee
could be afforded an administration claim for fees in the converted
case, a claim which the debtor would have to pay to get a plan
confirmed.40 The dangers of allowing creditors to object to a
debtor's use of chapter 7 have already been discussed.4 ' In the
United States Trustee districts, the problem could be solved easily
by giving the responsibility for objecting to the improper use of
chapter 7 to the United States Trustee.4 2
There is one other danger in allowing only the bankruptcy
judge to sua sponte object to the debtor's use of chapter 7. In districts with a heavy caseload, the bankruptcy judge will convene the
creditors' meeting, but not preside at it. The opposite might happen in smaller districts, where the bankruptcy judge might have
time to actually preside at the meeting. In addition, a judge with a
lighter caseload will have more time to prepare and pursue an objection to the debtor's use of chapter 7. Thus, the likelihood of a
judicial objection to the debtor's use of chapter 7 becomes greater
in those districts where there is a lighter caseload, and a dual standard will likely develop where debtors in some districts will be indirectly forced into chapter 13, while debtors in identical circumstances in other districts will find that they can use chapter 7
without objection.
The appellate process proposed by the OBIA in cases where a
40. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(9), 1322(a)(2), 1325(a)(1).

41. See original article at 8-16.
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 for a list of United States Trustee districts. The
idea, of course, is to have a neutral governmental officer object to the debtor's
alleged improper use of chapter 7 and then have a judge resolve the matter. This
minimizes problems of bias and makes irrelevant the economics of the pursuit of
the objection as being related to the question of whether it will generate sufficient
fee income or other economic benefit for a successful opponent. Perhaps in nonUnited States Trustee districts the objections could be pursued by the United
States Attorney. However, given the pressure of the criminal and civil docket of
most United States Attorney's offices, this approach is probably unrealistic.
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chapter 7 is dismissed on substantial abuse grounds needs clarification. The intent seems to be that only the debtor can appeal, yet
the statute would read that no appeal could be taken by a. "creditor or a representative of a creditor.

' 43

It is unclear whether this

would prohibit the trustee from taking an appeal from a decision
by the bankruptcy judge refusing to dismiss a chapter 7 petition on
substantial abuse grounds. Since a debtor should not be subjected
to harassing litigation challenging the debtor's right to use chapter
7, the OBIA should be changed to specify that the trustee cannot
appeal a refusal to dismiss.
The counseling process also would need further work before it
could function. Again, there is no relation between the counseling
process and the objection process, so there is no guarantee that
what the trustee learns in the counseling process will ever come to
the attention of the bankruptcy judge.44 In addition, since the trustee in the typical no asset consumer chapter 7 case is expecting a
fee of only twenty dollars, the trustee can hardly afford the time to
give the debtor meaningful counseling and then go to a creditors'
meeting convened by the bankruptcy judge. Even if the fee for no
asset cases is raised to forty-five dollars, as proposed by a "technical amendment" in the OBIA, 4" the economics of practice will dictate that the counseling of debtors be perfunctory at best.""
In addition, the environment of the counseling proposed by
the OBIA is faulty. The effort is to make the trustee a truly neutral counselor by requiring that the trustee make no recommendations to the debtor but merely give the debtor an unbiased view of
the options available. 7 What emerges is counseling so watered
down as to be meaningless. The debtor will be represented by
counsel at the session.48 Presumably, the debtor's lawyer will have
spelled out for the debtor the options available long before the
counseling session. The lawyer will have already invested the time
to come to the trustee for the session and is willing to do so only
because the creditors' meeting is to be scheduled immediately
43. S. 445 § 324(a).
44. See supra note 34.
45. S. 445 § 324(a).
46. But see S. REP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 55: "[I]t is the responsibility
of the court to ensure that trustees perform their duties under this section, and
courts shall have the power to fashion appropriate remedies, including but not
limited to denial of fees for a trustee's failure to perform such duties."
47. S. 445 § 204(4). See also S. REP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 54-55.
48. S. 445 § 204(4).
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thereafter.49 It is hard to imagine that a lawyer in such circumstances is going to readily accept a client's decision to convert to
chapter 13 at what amounts to the last minute. The lawyer will
have to prepare new documents, attend another creditors' meeting,
and perform other time-consuming duties. The economics of practice suggest that the debtor's lawyer will try to convince the debtor
to remain in chapter 7. This is particularly true since the trustee
cannot threaten to oppose the debtor's chapter 7 (a fact a debtor's
lawyer is likely to point out to the debtor)50 or even suggest to the
debtor that the court is likely to dismiss his/her petition because
the debtor has too much income. 1
Either the OBIA should be revised to provide a meaningful
counseling process by a trustee with authority to tell the debtor
the options and make meaningful recommendations, or it should
be dropped as so much window dressing.52 At a minimum, the trustee should be given the standing to oppose the debtor's use of
chapter 7 (should the trustee choose to do so) and the right to tell
the debtor of the trustee's intentions in that regard.
The process by which a debtor would conditionally select a
chapter for relief under the OBIA and then finally select a chapter
also needs further work. As presently drawn, the conditional choice
approach would apply whenever an individual debtor filed a chap49. See S. REP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 54. This is a remarkably practical
approach. If the counseling were to occur at a different time and place than the
creditors' meeting, the debtor's attorney would either have to make two appear-

ances in a routine consumer chapter 7 case, or, as more likely would be the case,
would have the debtor waive the right to counsel at the counseling session. The

OBIA would allow the debtor to waive the right to have an attorney present at

the counseling session. S. 445 § 204(4).
50. S. 445 § 204(4).

51. d. Of course, a trustee may not ask the court to dismiss a chapter 7

petition as being a substantial abuse of the provisions of that chapter. The court
can only act on its own motion in dismissing a chapter 7 petition on substantial
abuse grounds. Id. § 203(a).

52. In that regard, the approach to debtor counseling suggested by the original Bankruptcy Reform Commission might be worth reexamining. See REPORT OF

THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 137,

Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 122, 159-60 (1973). The process suggested by the

Bankruptcy Commission was almost identical to that suggested by the OBIA ex-

cept that it was workable because the counseling was to be done by a governmental official, a United States Bankruptcy Administrator. The Bankruptcy Adminis-

trator system would have been roughly equivalent to a nationwide United States

Trustee systemn, although with a good deal more power. Id. at 117-20.
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8 Under the OBIA,
ter 7, chapter 11 or chapter 13 petition.5
the
debtor must file a statement designating a final choice of chapter
for relief "no later than ten days after the counseling provided
under section 704(b)."' 54 Since the designation requirement appears
to apply in all chapters," and the counseling procedure is to apply
only in chapter 7, 5' it is unclear when an individual filing chapter
11 or chapter 13 is to act. It would be better to simply redraft the
OBIA to make it clear that the final designation procedure is applicable only when an individual debtor files a voluntary chapter 7
petition.
In addition to changing the question of who is eligible to file
chapter 7, the OBIA alters the BIA approach in several other areas. One of those areas is the question of what property a debtor
will be allowed to protect as exempt. The OBIA would change the
law of exempt property under the Bankruptcy Reform Act in several ways.' 7 The OBIA, unlike the early versions of the BIA, would
not eliminate the right of the debtor to choose between a federal
exemption provision and the debtor's own state exemption law unless the legislature of the debtor's state had denied such a choice to
its citizens by opting out of the federal bankruptcy exemption and
limiting its citizens solely to state exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings.' 8 The OBIA would, however, make the federal bankruptcy exemptions a good deal less attractive to those debtors living in states which have not opted out.
Two provisions of the federal bankruptcy exemption have received the attention of creditor ire as being too generous to debtors. One is the provision which allows a debtor to save any and all
items of household goods and the like which have a value to the

53. See S. 445 § 202.

54. Id. § 207(3).

55. S. 445 § 202 is not limited in effect to chapter 7 petitions.

56. The counseling provision is an amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 704 which
would become § 704(b). See S. 445 § 204. Section 704 of 11 U.S.C. applies only to
a chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 103(b). The counseling duties of a chapter 13

trustee do not appear to include counseling the debtor with respect to choice of

chapters. See id. § 1302(b)(3). The 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) provision contains no

cross-reference to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b) and none is proposed in S.445. In chapter 11
cases, there usually will be no trustee to counsel the debtor at all, as trustees in
chapter 11 may be appointed only for cause or in the interests of creditors and
equity security holders. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
57. The present exemption provision is 11 U.S.C. § 522.

58. See id. § 522(b).
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debtor of less than $200.1" What has irritated creditor interests is
that there is no dollar ceiling on this exemption. The OBIA would
respond to creditor complaints in this regard by placing a $4,000
limit on this exemption." The second aspect of the federal bankruptcy substantive exemption provision which has been very unpopular with creditor interests is that which allows the debtor to
exempt any interest in property s/he chooses to a value of $400
plus the unused amount of the homestead exemption. s Since the
homestead exemption is $7,500,"" this effectively gives debtors who
rent their homes $7,900 in "wildcard" or "grubstake" exemptions
to use to save anything that the debtor wants to keep. The OBIA
would limit the debtor's ability to use the unused homestead exemption to $2,000.63
Procedurally, the aspect of the bankruptcy exemption which
creditors dislike the most is the debtor's power to avoid nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interests on many types of exempt personal property, such as household goods, tools of trade,
etc.64 The OBIA would once again respond to creditor complaints
in this regard by effectively abolishing this right in all except actual hardship cases. s Instead, like the BIA," it would allow the
59. Id. § 522(d)(3).
60. S. 445 § 208(a)(3).

61. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).
62. Id. § 522(d)(1).

63. S. 445 § 208(a)(4). This provision is not as clear as it might be. As drawn,
it is not clear whether it allows a debtor to save any property worth up to $400
plus any unused homestead exemption to a total of $2,000, or whether it is $400
plus up to $2,000 in unused homestead exemption. The legislative history supports the latter interpretation. See S. REP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 58. In any
case, with respect to both proposed amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), it is hard
to see why Congress should move to limit the federal exemption rights afforded
debtors when it will only apply in those states where the state legislatures have
not chosen to opt out of the federal exemption provision under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
Presumably, in such states, the state legislatures have not found the existing federal exemption rights to be too generous to their citizens. As long as Congress is
willing to allow the states to interfere in the federal exemption process by opting
out, it ought to accept the judgment of those states which have not chosen to opt
out that the existing level of federal exemptions is appropriate for their citizens.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2).
65. S.445 §§ 208(b), 213(2). The OBIA would allow the debtor to avoid nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interests on household goods, tools of
trade, or the like, only if the debtor could not reasonably redeem the property
and if the enforcement of the lien would work a hardship on the debtor. Since the
change proposed by the OBIA is in the form of an amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 722,
this right would be available only in chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 103(b). It would not
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debtor to redeem most personal property interests from a lien by
paying off that lien in installments spread over up to five years at
appropriate interest. 7 However, the OBIA would allow the debtor
to be able to avoid nonpossessory, non-purchase money liens on
exempt tools of trade, professional books, implements to a total
value of $1,000, and professionally prescribed health aids, without
a showing of hardship."
In the area of the dischargeability of particular claims, the
OBIA would continue the BIA approach of making debts, incurred
by any debtor within forty days before the filing of a petition, presumed to be nondischargeable as fraudulent. 9 The presumption
would be rebuttable by the debtor. However, under the OBIA, the
presumption would not apply to the extent that debts, incurred
within forty days before a petition, were incurred by the debtor for
70
necessities for the support of the debtor or the debtor's family.
Like the BIA, the OBIA would change the provision of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act which mandates the court to award attorney's fees to the debtor for a successful defense to an objection to
the dischargeability of a claim on the grounds of fraud or a false
financial statement in all except the most unusual cases.7 1 However, the OBIA would modify the approach taken by the BIA to
provide that the debtor would get attorney's fees for a successful
defense if the creditor's objection was "not substantially justified. ' '7' The burden would be on the creditor to show that its obappear to be available to free motor vehicles from such liens on hardship grounds,
nor would it permit avoidance where the enforcement of the lien would work a
hardship on the debtor's dependents rather than directly on the debtor.
66. See S. 2000 §§ 8, 13 (discussed in the original article at 29 & 50).
67. S. 445 § 213. This right exists whether or not the property in question
would be exempt but for the lien. The right to redeem in installments appears to
be discretionary with the court.
68. Id. § 208(b). There is no dollar limit on the value of exempt professionally prescribed health aids which can be freed from non-purchase money, nonpossessory liens.
69. Id. § 209(b). Cf. S. 2000 § 9 (discussed in the original article at 30-33).
70. S. 445 § 209(b). The OBIA also contains a provision which would make
debts incurred by a debtor as a result of drunk driving nondischargeable. S. 445 §

261. But see In re Davis, 26 Bankr. 580 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re Naser, 7
Bankr. 116 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980) (drunk driving-related debts discharged
under BRA).

71. See S. 445 § 209(b); S. 2000 § 9; 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).

72. S. 445 § 209(b). This is the same standard used in the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2412.
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jection was substantially justified.7"

While this is a significant improvement over the BIA approach
to this provision, the OBIA provision is limited to objections to
dischargeability filed on the grounds of fraud or a false financial
statement. There is no reason for such a limitation. Any time that
a creditor files an objection to dischargeability, or for that matter

to discharge itself, on any ground at all which is not substantially
justified, the creditor ought to be made to pay the debtor's attor-

ney's fees for the debtor's successful defense to the specious
objection.
The OBIA makes no significant changes to the BIA approach
to chapter M."' Like the BIA, the OBIA tries to establish a scheme
for making sure that a debtor will make significant payments to
creditors in chapter 13. The OBIA in no way overcomes the criticisms of the BIA proposals for a chapter 13 change identified in
the original article. The author continues to believe that the idea
of giving the holders of nondischargeable claims effective priority
in chapter 13 and the proposed "bona fide effort" standard for
confirming chapter 13 plans are not good ideas.
The OBIA also continues most of the other BIA proposals
which were criticized in the original article, such as the proposal to
reinstate the question of the creditor's state of mind at the time of
the transfer back into the preference provision, 75 and the proposals
70
to alter the reaffirmation process.
73. S. REP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 59.
74. See S. 445 §§ 217-221. Cf. S. 2000 §§ 16-20 (discussed in the original
article at 54-66).
75. See S. 445 § 211(a) and S. 2000 § 11 (discussed in the original article at
46). The OBIA would also remove the 45-day limitation in the payments in the
ordinary course exception to the preference provision and would simply protect
all payments made by the debtor in the ordinary course of his/her business or
financial affairs regardless of how long after the debt was incurred the payment
was made. See S. 445 § 211(b). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). This would make an
objective rule subjective and lead to much wasteful litigation over what is and is
not in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and financial affairs.
76. See S. 445 § 210(b). The agreement is still to be filed with the court. It is
to be effective from the date of filing for a debtor represented by counsel; it is
effective from the date of court approval if the debtor is pro se in the bankruptcy
case. The debtor is given a 60-day cooling-off period which runs 60 days from the
filing or discharge, whichever is later. In this regard, the statement in the legislative history that a pro se debtor has the right to rescind within 60 days after court
approval of the agreement does not seem to be borne out by the language of the
OBIA, which does not gear the recission right into the date that the agreement
becomes effective. See S. RaP. No. 98-65, supra note 3, at 12; S. 445 § 210(b). In
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Interestingly enough, the OBIA does contain one new proposed change in the Bankruptcy Reform Act which has absolutely
nothing to do with consumer bankruptcy. At present, the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains a provision which prohibits a person
who is employed by a creditor from being employed by the official
creditors' committee in a chapter 11 case." The logic behind this
provision was the notion that simultaneous representation of a
creditor and a creditors' committee might create an impermissible
conflict of interest.' 8 Therefore, if a person is employed by a creditor, that person is per se banned from serving as attorney, account-

ant, or secretary to the official creditors' committee. Instead, the

committee must employ an outsider. The OBIA would alter this
provision by permitting a person employed by a creditor of the
same class represented by the committee to be employed by the
committee as well."
This OBIA proposal is not objectionable on the merits. The
bill would essentially leave the question of conflict of interest to
the bankruptcy court to be resolved on a case by case basis. There
would seem to be no reason to per se prohibit an attorney of a
creditor from becoming attorney for the creditors' committee in a
fact, the date that the agreement becomes effective appears to be virtually
irrelevant.
Although judicial review of the reaffirmation agreement appears to be
mandatory, what is not clear is what happens if the court fails to review the
agreement within 60 days of its filing as required by the statute. As discussed in
the original article at pages 42 to 44, it would appear that under the OBIA the
agreement would become effective automatically without judicial review, at least
in the case of a debtor represented by counsel. S. 445 § 210(b).
Under present law, 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4), any reaffirmation agreement by any
debtor of a consumer debt secured by real property would become effective without judicial review. Apparently, if the debtor has use and possession of collateral
during the 60-day cooling-off period, payments made by the debtor need not be
held in trust by the creditor in case the agreement is rescinded by the debtor or
disapproved by the bankruptcy court.
The principal problem with the OBIA proposal with respect to reaffirmations,
like its BIA counterpart (S. 2000 § 10, discussed in the original article at 42-44), is
that the OBIA amendment would give the court no standards to use in deciding
whether or not.to approve a proposed reaffirmation agreement. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
524(c)(4). The reaffirmation provision of the OBIA needs further work to come up
with a workable system which will function as the drafters intended it to work.

77. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b).

78. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 402 (1977); S.
supra note 3, at 61-62.
79. S. 445 § 214.
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situation where no conflict existed. In fact, in most cases, the committee would be better off in having the advantage of the attorney's previous knowledge of and experience with the debtor available to it. There would be no delay while a new attorney learned
about the case. If a potential conflict did exist, as, for example,
where the creditor represented by the attorney who sought to be
hired by the committee had received preference, the court could
solve the problem simply by refusing to approve the retention of
the attorney by the committee.80 Ethical requirements would require the attorney to reveal the potential conflict to the
committee.8'
What is objectionable about the proposed change is that it is
buried in a section of the OBIA entitled "Consumer Credit
Amendments." This, however, is not a consumer credit amendment. Consumers do not file chapter 11 cases. Chapter 11 cases are
business cases. The proponents of this change in chapter 11 law
ought to be up front about it and identify it for what it really is so
that it will be available for scrutiny by all who favor and oppose it.
The OBIA suffers from many of the same weaknesses from
which the BIA suffered. Like the BIA, it does not satisfactorily establish the basic proposition that there is anything fundamentally
wrong with the Bankruptcy Reform Act other than the fact that it
is fairer to debtors than were previous bankruptcy laws. Instead, it
starts with the unsubstantiated proposition that the substantial
upswing in the number of consumer bankruptcy cases since 1979 is
a result of this new liberal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Thus,
the proponents of the OBIA say that we must assume that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act has failed, and we must build on that premise. The problem is that the assumption on which both the BIA
and OBIA build, the failure of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, is simply not proved.
The proponents of the BIA relied on a single study as establishing the fact that a large number of consumer debtors were taking advantage of the "liberal" provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act to get out of debts which these consumers could
otherwise pay from their reasonably foreseeable future disposable
income.82 That study, which was financed by the consumer credit
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
81. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

id. EC 5-16.
82.

CREDIT RESEARCH

RESPONSIBILITY
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GRADUATE

MENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY

DR 5-105(c). See also
SCHOOL OF MANAGE-

(1982) (referred to as
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industry, was questioned in the original article.83 It was suggested
that further study was in order. Since the original article dealing
with the BIA was written, another study of consumer bankruptcy
has been completed which reached directly the opposite conclusion
from that reached by the consumer credit industry's study.8 4 That
later study concluded: "Our major findings are that most of the
debtors in personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 are poor or nearpoor by the usual BLS and Census Bureau standards. Their real
incomes have been decreased over the three years for which we
have enough information. . . . "5 This study and its conclusions
can hardly give comfort to those who claim that the reason there
has been such an upsurge in bankruptcy filings under the Bankruptcy Reform Act is that deadbeat debtors are using the bankruptcy law to deprive creditors of their right to get at large
amounts of disposable income. What these two conflicting studies
do suggest is that a neutral study is required before it can be determined what changes, if any, are required in consumer bankruptcy law. It is again recommended that the Bankruptcy Act
Commission be reassembled and a study of the Bankruptcy Reform Act be undertaken by that Commission.8
Although the OBIA is not as anti-debtor as the BIA, it does
propose an erosion of many of the debtor protection devices which
were implemented by the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Frankly, the
OBIA seems to be an attempt by creditor interests to swing the
bankruptcy law pendulum as far their way as they think they can
get away with in the current political environment. While creditor
interests may have made some concessions in the OBIA, as Senator
Metzenbaum said:
S. 445 ... still tips the balance unnecessarily in favor of creditors
at a most inappropriate time. This still is a creditors' bill. It is not
a debtors' or consumers' bill. And consumers are the ones who
have suffered so much from inflation, so much from the high interest rates, and so much from the record postwar unemployment
87
that, in my opinion, no bill at all would be the best bill.
PURDUE STUDY).

83. See the original article at 17-18.
84. Schuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753
Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 CoM. L.J. 288 (1983).

85. Id. at 306.

86. See the original article at 17-18, 33, 72.
87. 129 CONG. REC. S5,387 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983). See also S. REP. No. 9865, supra note 3, at 90-91.

